Background and Issue of International Relations
The Cold War was both an ideological battle as well as one of an arms race. The primary principle that guided international relations between the two superpowers was nuclear deterrence, which indicated that the possession of nuclear weapons prevents any other state from attacking with their own nuclear weapons or other WMDs due to the potential of retaliation and likely mutually assured destruction (MAD). The politics of the Cold War concentrated heavily on developing and enhancing nuclear arms capability in various forms (Brown and Arnold 2010). Both countries competed on the number of nuclear warheads produced and types of delivery methods available. In the early 1960s, the US was realistically winning the arms race both in the number of warheads and missiles, as well as the various technological capabilities associated in their delivery and accuracy.
The USSR understood that the US had a stronger hand in ‘first strike capability,’ or essentially the ability to strike the Soviet Union first without giving it the opportunity for a proportionate retaliation, placing the concept of nuclear deterrence and MAD into question. This was further perpetuated by the US placing delivery modes near Soviet borders, both with submarines as well as missiles in Turkey, approximately 1000 miles from Moscow, and less than 300 miles to the Russian border (Scott and Hughes 2015). At this time, the US and Soviet Union had diplomatic relations, but there was no direct communication, and a significant mistrust of each other’s diplomatic missions was present due to prevalent espionage.
Crisis
In 1959, Fidel Castro led a communist revolution on the island of Cuba, only 90 miles south of Florida. Under the influence of the communist sphere of influence, Castro and the new government aligned themselves with the Soviet Union. The Soviet nuclear missile capability focused on mid-range missiles (MRBMs) and they have not yet achieved stable results on the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which are the kingpins of nuclear arsenals. Therefore, the USSR could not easily reach continental US from its standard land-based positions (Colman 2016). Given the overwhelming communist support in Cuba and all of the reasons listed above, the Soviet Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev decided to equalize the strategic nuclear balance and deploy short- and mid-range nuclear ballistic missiles in Cuba
On October 15, 1962, as part of regular surveillance flights, a U2 plane photographed clear missile installations on the island, confirming suspicions by the CIA that the USSR was placing nuclear missiles capable of reaching continental US in Cuba, placing the country in immediate danger. Meanwhile, the Soviets denied any knowledge of the matter, despite evidence to the contrary (Colman 2016). The US President, John F. Kennedy, was presented multiple options of response, specifically pressured by a unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a full-scale invasion of the island. However, any offensive strike against Cuba was likely to cascade into a full nuclear war. On October 21, Kennedy chose to implement the route of blockading Cuba, only allowing ships through after inspection of cargo, while simultaneously seeking a diplomatic solution. However, the crisis deepened as the construction of the missile installations continued at a rapid pace, and the US placed its nuclear forces on high alert, eventually reaching DEFCON 2 and preparing all forces for nuclear attack (Scott and Hughes 2015). The US attempted both public and private political pressure, and by October 26, Kennedy was nearly confident the only solution was a military one.
The crisis had become a stalemate, with Khrushchev not backing down, and the US being gravely concerned for its safety. However, the threat of attacks on Cuba allowed the US to place pressure on Khrushchev to continue talks. The crisis was further deepened by a U2 plane shot down over Cuba, while a Soviet submarine accidentally damaged by depth charges tests nearly launched its warheads (Colman 2016). The world was seemingly on the brink of a nuclear apocalypse, waiting to be sparked by a single miscalculation.
Resolution
By late October, the Soviets began to shift its tone in negotiations and messages, seeming more alarmed and desperate, giving an advantage to the US in further talks. However, Khrushchev wanted a guarantee that the US would not invade Cuba during or in the aftermath of the crisis, suggesting the Soviets would then withdraw. After long secret negotiations, the sides agreed that if USSR was to remove missiles from Cuba, the US would remove its weapon systems from Turkey and Southern Italy. Given that the situation was quickly getting out of control, and a nuclear conflict would destroy significant portions of humanity, both Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed to the terms (Weaver 2013). The US had agreed to respect the sovereignty of Cuba, but never made the removal of its European missiles public. The US continued monitoring progress until the Soviets fully removed all nuclear delivery methods from the island.
Aftermath and Policy
Given the peak of the crisis came so close to a nuclear confrontation, in the aftermath there were efforts from both sides to ease tensions and engage in diplomacy. However, ideological hardliners from both sides largely prevented this from happening due to deep mistrust and belief that the leaders essentially conceded strategic positions (Weaver 2013). Nevertheless, some policies in nuclear arms testing and control were established. Furthermore, the crisis led to the establishment of the famous Moscow-Washington hotline, a direct communication to prevent any potential miscalculations and potentially resolve such crises in the future (Colman 2016). Despite the many close calls, the Cuban Missile Crisis is seen as an exemplary and practical employment of coercive and preventive diplomacy to achieve strategic interests while resolving a situation of such existential threat to the US.
Strengths and Weaknesses
The strengths of Kennedy’s decisions and diplomacy were in the fact that they did not produce the violent military confrontation that would have resulted most likely in a nuclear conflict and World War III. In fact, Kennedy sought to avoid that decision, despite being pressured by the Joint Chiefs. Kennedy’s decision-making was dependent on weighing the many considerations and variables, one of which was that even if Khrushchev did not want to start a war, any attack, even a targeted one on the installations, would force him to respond with more force (Weaver 2013). Kennedy took a route that sought to deescalate the situation as much as possible by limiting the incoming armaments, while engaging in heavy diplomacy with the Soviets. Furthermore, diplomatically, Kennedy’s administration used its strength and pressure points, while creating the illusion of compromise, because the missiles in Turkey were considered largely obsolete, and the US continued to possess much greater nuclear capability than the USSR (Sherwin 2020). The US fostered a situation, both publicly and privately, that made it possible for Khrushchev to back down without drastically shifting the existing balance of nuclear forces and avoiding public embarrassment.
The weakness in the decisions was two-fold. First, instigating a blockade in Cuba could have forced Soviets to repeat their blockade of Western Berlin from 1948, which would significantly increase tensions in Europe. However, the US needed a means to stop the progress on the missile systems in Cuba while negotiations were ongoing without directly attacking any ships or installations (Sherwin 2020). Finally, the decision to initially avoid military action may have seemed politically weak, especially to hardliners who believed in US military dominance. However, Kennedy was provided with data that a full-scale war would result in 80 million US deaths, and it was too great a risk.
Alternative Plans
When convening a group of national security council members and advisors known as EXCOMM, Kennedy was presented with 6 key options. There was the option of doing nothing, considering Soviet missile vulnerability was common at the time (albeit never this close to US borders). There were the more peaceful options of blockading and pursuing diplomacy. Another option was to directly contact Castro and attempt to threaten Cuba if he did not stop the deployment of missiles, but after Castro’s public remarks of the will and ability of Cuba to retaliate to invasions, this was off the table. Finally, the military options consisted of air strikes on the installations and a full-scale invasion, overthrowing Castro and establishing a temporary civil government (Grattan 2004). Realistically, there were few other possibilities which were not variations of the ones listed above. Kennedy chose to pursue a pragmatic option of blockading Cuba while engaging USSR in diplomacy both publicly through the UN and ambassadors, as well as under the table talks towards de-escalation.
Reference List
Brown, Andrew, and Lorna Arnold. 2010. “The Quirks of Nuclear Deterrence.” International Relations 24 (3): 293–312. Web.
Colman, Jonathan. 2016. Cuban Missile Crisis: Origins, Course and Aftermath. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.
Grattan, Robert F. 2004. “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Strategy Formulation in Action.” Management Decision 42 (1): 55–68. Web.
Scott, Len, and Hughes, Gerald R. 2015. The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal. New York: Routledge.
Sherwin, Martin J. 2020. “Inside JFK’s Decision-making During the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Time, Web.
Weaver, M. E. 2013. “The Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force: An Example from the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Diplomatic History 38 (1): 137–81. Web.