Introduction
There are many different views on God’s existence and the questions of belief nowadays. Many scientists, philosophers, and researchers, regardless of what position they support, build many theories and suggestions related to religion. The development of one such theory, namely reformed epistemology, started in the middle of the 20th century.
This paper examines reformed epistemology and its weaknesses as it relates to the apologetic task of demonstrating God’s existence. For the purposes of this paper analyzes the concepts and theories suggested by one of the pioneers of reformed epistemology, a philosopher named Alvin Plantinga. Reformed epistemology seems to have many flaws as a theological theory because it does not prove God’s existence but merely denies the need for a logical explanation.
Main Body
First, it is essential to discuss what epistemology is and the role reformed epistemology plays in the modern understanding of religion. Epistemology is the theory of knowledge that investigates whether a particular judgment or statement should be identified as a justified belief or just someone’s opinion. Therefore, the goal of religious epistemology is to ascertain whether or not a person’s particular beliefs about God’s existence fall under one of the two categories. One of this theory’s components is reformed epistemology, which has a particular core thesis. This thesis suggests that religious beliefs “can be rational without being based on propositional evidence or argument” (Baldwin and McNabb 3). Three essential elements of the belief in God are examined by reformed epistemology: the intellectual propriety of the corresponding claims, their rationality, and their reasonability. The theory was defended by an American philosopher, Alvin Plantinga, in his work God and Other Minds (Baldwin and McNabb 3). That particular work, along with other writings on reformed epistemology, seeks to prove the rationality and reasonability of believing in God.
The first significant argument in favor of God’s existence that reformed epistemology suggests is related to some fundamental beliefs. For example, the philosophical idea of solipsism suggests that there are no other minds but one’s own since the opposing arguments fail to establish a solid conclusion (Baldwin and McNabb 4). Nonetheless, people mostly find it foolish or irrational to believe that other minds do not exist, making the existence of multiple minds natural and, thereby, rational. The same is true for many beliefs: the belief in the existence of one’s self, the external world, the present, and the past. In other words, the proponents of the theory propose that God’s existence is fundamental and undoubted, meaning that rational arguments are not necessary.
However, the described viewpoint seems more like a weakness of the theory than its strong side since it does not present an actual argument or at least a reasonable or valuable suggestion. Reformed epistemology, in this sense, explains the existence of God based on the concept of parity of reasoning: some points do not require any argument, and God’s presence is one of them (Baldwin and McNabb 5). It does not appear as a valid point since such a suggestion relies on other beliefs that are not related to the subject. That argument can prove why some people believe in God without rational reasoning: they do not need it as their faith is strong enough. Such a position is entirely acceptable in justifying one’s beliefs, but it is unacceptable in demonstrating God’s existence. A theistic person can use that point to explain their beliefs to themselves, but they would not be able to persuade someone who is not a believer with that argument.
Following the thought of believers, there is another notable point in the theory of reformed epistemology suggesting that believers’ confidence does not come from rational arguments. Plantinga, for example, argues that “because scripture proceeds from God as the starting point, believers are within their epistemic rights to take belief in God as the starting point” (qtd. in Baldwin and McNabb 4). It is a basic fact that people in the current world accept one another’s beliefs and that merely because someone believes in God, they are unlikely to be insulted or treated disrespectfully. However, that argument deconstructs the whole point of building a theological theory, such as reformed epistemology, to try and prove the rationality of believing in God. That argument succeeds in explaining one’s belief in God, but it fails to demonstrate God’s existence to other people.
Most theological theories’ main goal is to explain the essence of God to other people so they can accept it and understand why God exists and what rational reasons can prove it. That goal is the primary reason for multiple discussions and arguments in modern theology. There is a critical contradiction in the case of Plantinga’s views on reformed epistemology. As mentioned in the previous sections of the paper, some of the reformed epistemology’s main components are rationality and reasonability. However, the theory argues that believers do not “need arguments or propositional evidence for their belief in God to have rational justification” (Baldwin and McNabb 4). If one accepts that position, a question will arise on the purpose of a theological theory. Reformed epistemology, in many senses, explains why believers have the right to believe, but nobody tries to take that right from them, meaning that there is no need for the whole theory. The theory is needed to demonstrate God’s existence to people who cannot or do not want to accept it, and the described argument fails to achieve that goal.
Furthermore, there is another critical contradiction in reformed epistemology that cannot be ignored, and it relates to the theory’s views on other sacramental beliefs. The “Son of Great Pumpkin objection” is a counterargument put forth by certain opponents of reformed epistemology (Baldwin and McNabb 10). The essence of the objection is the following: the absence of the necessity to provide a rational explanation for God’s existence can make various communities legitimately claim that their beliefs are rational. For example, Voodoo believers can claim that they follow their ways based on the concept of rationality, as Christians do (Baldwin and McNabb 10). There may be communities based on irrational or even dangerous beliefs, such as the proponents of the flat-earth idea or devil worshipers. If the presence of God didn’t require a logical justification, then other beliefs wouldn’t either, which would have unfavorable effects.
Nevertheless, the mentioned contradiction is not as much related to the object itself as to the reformed epistemology’s response. The theory under discussion, replying to the Son of Great Pumpkin objection, suggests the following. If humanity’s “cognitive design plan is not set up to form a belief in the deities of voodoo or the Great Pumpkin, then belief in such things would be mistaken” (Baldwin and McNabb 10). In other words, people’s minds have always been established to believe in God, which frees that belief from rationality, but people’s cognition does not suggest believing in Voodoo, making that belief irrational. There is an evident contradiction in this statement related to the fact that there is no evidence that God’s existence is a fundamental element of humanity’s cognition. In many senses, the described response to the objection means that people should believe in God since they are supposed to believe in God on a cognitive level. In the previous points of the reformed epistemology, this one does not present an argument and makes belief in God look natural, neither demonstrating God’s existence nor proving it.
Overall, reformed epistemology appears as a weak theological theory as it does not provide arguments in favor of God’s existence, claiming that belief in God is fundamental and does not require a rational explanation. The whole point of the theory is correlated with rationality and reasonability, as stated in reformed epistemology’s core thesis. However, the proponents of the theory contradict that thesis in their position, suggesting that believing in God is a concept that can exist without rational evidence. Reformed epistemology suggests that people do not need to argue for their beliefs, and their faith in God does not need to be rational. It is a solid and respectable viewpoint that cannot and should not be argued, but it does not prove God’s existence to those who believe in it. Since people can believe in God without a religious theory, the objectives of reformed epistemology may need to be reexamined.
Numerous difficulties have been shown in the Plantinga model and must either be overcome or avoided. Some of them should be outside the scope of this work, and others can be avoided easily. Some people, however, still confront significant obstacles. Which of the foregoing arguments falls into the last category will be examined in this section. According to him the work of numerous philosophers and theologians in the book has been the subject of WCB criticism. His views are vital for the paper’s purposes, regardless of whether they truly reflect Calvin’s, Aquinas’, Reid’s, or anybody else’s thoughts (McAllister et al., 543). The A/C model and his Free Will Defense against the problem, as Helm points out, are in conflict. Therefore, this issue is to be resolved, and it is not clear how to resolve the conflict.
This was not his choice, but evil would have made her choose between them. Importantly, the answer to the problem of evil does not depend on his defense of Free Will as a possible winner of the WCB-certified Christian faith. Except for the challenge of plurality or religious diversity and non-religion, complete discussion of the re-examination of the prospective thesis winners is also not properly explored in the WCB (McAllister et al., 539). Reformed epistemology, in general, and Plantinga’s theory have taken diverse approaches to these issues, which are plainly crucial.
Attempting to tackle these fundamental issues may raise replies from these altered winners, but my focus in this work is not on the expectations that may arise. Best of all, it appears that Le Morvan and Radcliffe’s extended A/C model challenge to compliance or reasonableness does not need to continue long. They argued against the IIHS account in two separate ways, as I outlined above. They were both opposed to Plantinga because he treats the IIHS as a process of faith understanding or practice, which rejects the religious fact that the Holy Spirit is a distinct individual from the believer, free to operate as they see fit. Despite the fact that this critique appears to be fair, it is simple to fix.
There are many ways to look at sensus divinitatus and IIHS as a corrective intervention technique used in the treatment of dysfunctional sensus divinitatus in the same way that mirrors provide corrective vision in the same way that the eye doctor’s intervention with a scalpel or laser can be used to correct visual acuity. Both Le Morvan and Radcliffe will no longer be able to oppose such a restructure of IIHS while at the same time maintaining the efficiency of the Plantinga model (McAllister et al., 537). A valid fundamental challenge, a moral antagonism, an “other question,” and a difficulty with religious variety are all left out of Plantinga’s argument. Here, I will lay out the challenges under these sections for our consideration and try to integrate those arguments into a cohesive exposition of the scale of these objections and the difficulties presented in Plantinga and Reformed epistemology.
When it comes down to philosophical analysis, all of his arguments for the existence of other theories and beliefs in God fail. If my belief in other senses is reasonable, so is my belief in God. However, the first one is obvious; as a result, it is the last. The arguments for a logical belief in God evolved along with his thinking. According to Warranted Christian Belief, he no longer considers testimony to be the only way to support his belief in God (McAllister et al., 539). Because of the shift in perspective, a more radical argument against equality can be made, arguing that just as the experience of God is justified, a feeling of mental clarity.
Patterns emerge in the argument for the equal belief in God. To begin, we want to draw attention to those ideas and principles that we hold to be solid and unwavering. To put it another way, it must be a belief based solely on logic and not on evidence or argument (Kvadal et al., 414). The ideology assumes that if the requirements of evidence are met, there could be harmful epistemological effects; it is assumed that this is what he wants. As an example, I believe that a clock is hanging on the wall (Harris et al., 110). It would be difficult to support my beliefs with evidence that was contradictory or circular. But this is what the subject matter expert wants. In the case of our ideological beliefs, it cannot be said that we as agents are unjust, emotional, or rigid in our belief if we can ignore the demands of witnesses in the matter of ideological beliefs. If this is the case, then perhaps the demands placed on evidence of the belief in God should be reconsidered (Harris et al., 110). This begs the question of whether or not evidence is actually required. In this respect, the theory shares some characteristics with other radical epistemologists. Another parallel is drawn between religious and intellectual experiences.
Certain cognitive experiences give rise to cognitive beliefs, and a person’s original beliefs emerge suddenly in the mind of an attentive observer. Theoretical explanations for what is taking place are correct. According to Plantinga, there is a striking resemblance between the visionary’s beliefs and the Christian belief in God (Harris, 114). The idea is that our perceptive powers are a result of our belief in God and the belief in both. Consequently, if one believes in a concept like “I see a tree,” then one can also believe in God in the same way, for example, as the result of a certain mental capacity (Kvadal et al., 4019). Is there some secret knowledge that leads people to believe in God in a hasty and meaningless manner? The renames a well-known term, “sensus divinitatis,” which is a slang term for “sense of divinity.” (Harris, 115). God can be received and accepted by man without any doubt or evidence, according to Calvin, who the theory referred to as sensus divinitatis. Belief in God is not based on evidence or argument because of the action of sensus divinitatis.
Conclusion
A good summation of his position can be found in Calvin’s claim that God made us in such a way that we naturally gravitate toward faith in him (Harris et al., 111):
This tendency has contributed to the obfuscation or acceptance of some forms of sin. Because of sin, we are not as enthusiastic about the existence of God as we are about the existence of others, the world, or even our own past. In our present state of sin, it is difficult or foolish for many to believe in God (Kvandal 119). This is a normal human condition. Rather than a man who does not believe in the existence of his wife or who believes that he is probably a very intelligent and intelligent robot, Calvin believes an atheist to be in shock (McAllister et al., 547). Though it is largely suppressed, this belief in God still exists around the world. The sensus divinitatis, or divine feeling, is a Calvinian term for what Plantinga calls “a kind of thinking or a feeling, which in various circumstances expresses belief in God.” (McAllister et al., 547). When it comes to belief in God, as with theories of ideas such as “I see the table,” the belief is both irrational and justifiable under certain circumstances.
Works Cited
Baldwin, Erik, and Tyler Dalton McNabb. Plantingian Religious Epistemology and World Religions: Prospects and Problems. Lexington Books, 2018. Web.
Harris, Harriet A. “Does Analytical Philosophy Clip our Wings? Reformed Epistemology as a Test Case.” Faith and Philosophical Analysis. Routledge, 2019. 100-118.
Kvandal, Halvor. “The god-faculty dilemma: Challenges for reformed epistemology in the light of cognitive science.” International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 81.4 (2020). 404-422. Web.
Kvandal, H. (2022). Do We Have a God-Faculty? A New Appraisal of Reformed Epistemology. In God Naturalized (pp. 119-143). Springer, Cham.
McAllister, Blake, and Trent Dougherty. “Reforming reformed epistemology: a new take on the sensus divinitatis.” Religious studies 55.4 (2019). 537-557. Web.